Regulatory protection when firms move first by Huw Edwards (1250523)
 
 
 
This item was submitted to Loughborough’s Institutional Repository 
(https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/) by the author and is made available under the 
following Creative Commons Licence conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the full text of this licence, please go to: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
 
   
    
  
ISSN 1750-4171 
 
        
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
 
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 
 
 
 
Regulatory Protection When Firms Move First 
 
T.Huw Edwards 
 
 
WP 2009 - 19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
Dept Economics 
Loughborough University 
Loughborough  
LE11 3TU  United Kingdom 
Tel:  + 44 (0) 1509 222701 
Fax: + 44 (0) 1509 223910 
http://www.lboro.ac.uk/departments/ec 
Regulatory Protection When Firms Move First
T.Huw Edwards, CSGR, Warwick and Dept of Economics, Loughborough University
November 25, 2009
Abstract
I investigate the imposition of a horizontal technical barrier to trade (HTBT) in a symmetric, cross-
hauling duopoly. Tari¤s and subsidies are ruled out, but, in the absence of a mutual recognition agree-
ment, it is possible for governments to impose HTBTs, so long as rms apply di¤erent technologies.
If rms are rst movers, this possibility may induce them to avoid technical collaboration, in order to
tempt governments into creating local monopolies, except where spillovers and R&D e¤ects are high. This
exacerbates the costs of regulatory protection, compared to standard models without R&D or spillovers.
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1 Introduction
The issue of alleged regulatory protection has become a contentious one, particularly as other forms of
protection have been reduced by trade liberalisation. The World Trade Organization, in 1995, states that
Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view
to or with the e¤ect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade. For this purpose,
technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to full a legitimate objec-
tive....
While, in principle, this outlaws explicit regulatory protection, the problem is the acknowledgement
that technical regulations - on product quality, on environmental, health or safety standards, on network
1
standards or on labelling and warranty conditions - are legitimate, and often unavoidable. Reasons for this
include limitation of externalities1 , avoidance of market failure due to informational problems, ensuring that
network externalities are e¢ ciently exploited, and controlling for monopolistic distortions.2
The problem is that any of these reasons can, in practice, be misused to justify what is, in practice,
regulatory protection.3 Hence, while standard protection, such as tari¤s and quotas, can easily be ruled out
by the WTO and other trade agreements, technical barriers to trade (TBTs) are less visible and harder, in
practice, to control.
The starting-point of this paper is that the existing literature on TBTs assumes that governments - or
national bodies, such as standards councils - act rst, and that rms respond.4 The problem with this view is
that, in practice, the choice of technologies is not exogenous. Technology develops by a process of research and
development (R&D), which can be either carried out individually by rms, or in collaboration, at a national
or a cross-border level. Collaboration is usually in order to reduce the costs of developing new technology
- the decision to establish a collaborative relationship between rms allows for partial internalisation and
exploitation of spillovers.5 Moreover, it may make it possible for rms to share suppliers, yielding scale
economies. However, in the presence of national borders, there may be other motivations: a collaboration
essentially means that rms products share a technological base, which means that it is very di¢ cult
for regulatory authorities to exclude one rms product, or to impose high adaptation costs to a nationally-
specied technology - a process which we could summarise as a horizontal technical barrier to trade (HTBT).
This raises an interesting question - in a situation where governments feel able to exploit technological
rules and regulations for protectionist purposes, but are constrained from using more obvious trade instru-
ments, such as tari¤s, will rms prefer to set up their technological collaborations in order to minimise
protection, or will they deliberately attempt to trigger protection? In other words, does allowing rms to
move rst make the issue of regulatory protection more or less serious?
1Costinot, 2008.
2Crampes and Hollander (1995), Lutz (1996) and (2000), Edwards (2009).
3Maskus and Wilson (eds 2001). Sturm (2006).
4Strictly speaking, standards are agreed by rms, often with support from governments, while regulations are compulsory.
See Sykes (1995).
5Gil-Molto et al (2005).
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Interesting examples of this dilemma include the past history of development of television network stan-
dards (with the American NTSC system, the German PAL and French SECAM), which created di¢ culties
for Japanese TV manufacturers (whose home country adopted NTSC) to enter European markets. Another
interesting example is the choice of di¤erent technological routes for aviation, with Boeing pulling out of
a potential collaboration with Airbus on wide-bodied planes,6 which may lead to potential issues over the
planning of future airport expansions in the USA, suitable for the wider A380.
The structure of the paper is as follows. I start in Section 2 by setting up a theoretical model of a
Cournot duopoly, where one rm is foreign. The local regulator chooses the level of a pure, horizontal
technical barrier to trade (HTBT). It is shown that, when rms are symmetric, a totally exclusionary barrier
will be set. Section 3 then introduces R&D expenditure into the model, with or without spillovers between
companies. It is shown that rms will prefer to trigger protection, except where both the e¤ect of R&D
on costs and the potential spillovers between collaborating rms are large. Section 4 shows that, where
rms choose to trigger protection, the welfare costs are higher than in a model with constant marginal costs.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Regulatory protection in a duopoly without R&D
Consider rst the situation ignoring R&D and technical collaboration. The broad framework is an extension
of Brander (1980) and Brander and Spencers (1985) work. As in Edwards (2009), there is a symmetric,
cross-hauling duopoly, with rms 1 and 2 based in countries 1 and 2 respectively. I assume there are no
transport costs involved, and tari¤s are ruled out.
The inverse demand function is assumed to be linear in form, products are homogeneous from the
standpoint of customers (even though they may be produced with di¤erent technology), and without loss of
generality we can choose scale such that
P = 1 Q1  Q2; (1)
6 Irwin and Pavcnik (2004). Pavcnik (2002).
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I set marginal revenue equal to marginal cost, C, which is constant and equal for the two rms, so that
prot-maximising output
Q1 =
1  C  Q2
2
; (2)
Q2 =
1  C     Q1
2
: (2a)
Solving the rst-order conditions to maximise prots, Cournot-Nash equilibrium sales of the two rms in
country 1 are:
Q1 =
1  C + 
3
; (3a)
Q2 =
1  C   2
3
: (3b)
Hence we can derive
Prot 1 = (P   C)Q1 = (1  C + )
2
9
: (4)
Consumer Surplus V =
(2(1  C)  )2
18
: (5)
If the national regulator in country 1 is assumed to maximise W1 = 1 + V , then we can derive
W1 =
1
6
[2(1  C)2 + 2]: (6)
It follows that the prot-shifting e¤ect outweighs the loss of consumer surplus. Hence
Proposition 1: Where tari¤s are ruled out, in the presence of a cross-hauling, Cournot duopoly, a
country will choose to impose a HTBT to exclude the foreign rm, unless the foreign rm can produce
signicantly more cheaply than the domestic rm.
Proof. Di¤erentiating (6), @W1@ =

3 ; which shows that the marginal returns to increasing  are positive and
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increasing.
Where the rms are asymmetric, it is possible to show (Edwards, 2009) that country 1 will cease to
exclude rm 2 if
C1 >
1
3
+
2C2
3
; (7)
in other words, if rm 2 is substantially cheaper than rm 1. In this case, no HTBT will be applied.
3 The game with R&D and/or spillovers
3.1 The game without spillovers
We assume now that rms can alter technology, and consider rst the case where R&D a¤ects costs, but
there are no spillovers. This may reect the situation where the rms choose not to collaborate.
The game sequence is as follows:
Sequential setup of game Sequence 1
1. Tari¤s are banned;
2. Firms decide on collaboration;
3. Firms set R&D;
4. Each country decides on HTBT;
5. Firms set output levels.
Marginal costs if rms do not collaborate are assumed to decline with respect to the rms R&D activity:
C1 = C   bR1; (8a)
C2 = C   bR2: (8b)
In this case, C represents marginal cost with no R&D expenditure, and b is the R&D sensitivity of marginal
cost.
The assumption that rms set R&D expenditure before governments decide on setting HTBTs is impor-
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tant. This means that marginal costs, C1 and C2, are constant as far as the governments are concerned:
consequently, we have
Lemma 1 If rms do not collaborate, and costs are symmetric, then governments will choose to impose an
HTBT to exclude the foreign rm. Each rm will, consequently, have a monopoly in its own local market.
Proof. See above. This follows from Proposition 1, which indicates, inter alia, that C1 and C2 will be
exogenous from the point-of-view of the national regulators.
It is now possible to solve for country 1s market, on the basis that rm 2 will be excluded (so that
Q2 = 0). I also assume that there are diminishing marginal returns to R&D expenditure, such that, if R is
the level of e¤ective R&D activity, it costs R2. Hence, solving for the rst order condition for maximising
prot, we obtain the following estimates of optimum R&D activity and marginal cost:
R =
b
4  b2 (1  C); (9)
C = C   b
2
4  b2 (1  C): (10)
3.2 Parameter restrictions
Note that this model requires restrictions on b and C:
1. For positive b, C is declining with respect to b, and reaches 0 when
b = 2
p
C: (11)
2. For nonnegative demand we also require C < 1:This happens when
b =
p
2: (12)
Consequently, we can deduce that prot
6
(1  C)2 =
1
4  b2 6
1
2
: (13)
3.3 The game with a positive R&D spillover
Let us now assume that rms decide to collaborate over research, developing their product on a common
standard. This creates a spillover, , from R&D e¤ort, where  2 f0; 1g, such that
C1 = C   bR1   bR2; (14a)
C2 = C   bR2   bR1: (14b)
The higher  is, the greater the potential benets to rms from collaborating, as opposed to going it
alone.
Firm 1s prot
1 =
2
9
(1  C + (2  )bR1   (1  2)bR2))2  R21: (15)
Maximisation in a symmetric equilibrium gives R&D activity
R0 =
2(2  )b
9  2(2  )(1 + )b2 (1  C); (16)
marginal cost,
C 0 = C   2(2  )(1 + )b
2
9  2(2  )(1 + )b2 (1  C); (17)
and prot,
1
(1  C)2 =
18  4(2  )2b2
(9  2(2  )(1 + )b2)2 : (18)
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3.4 Will rms collaborate?
We can now solve for rms decision on whether to collaborate, and save costs, or alternatively develop
separate technology, gaining a local monopoly. This depends upon whether 1 in equation (18) is greater
than  in equation (13). First of all, we can derive
Proposition 2: In the absence of spillovers ( = 0) rms will always prefer a local monopoly to a
crosshauling duopoly.
Proof. This follows by setting  = 0 in (18). The condition for whether a local monopoly is preferred
becomes

(1  C)2 =
1
4 B >
1
(1  C)2 =
18  16B
(9  4B)2 ; (19)
substituting B = b2 for simplicity
(9  4B)2   (4 B)(18  16B) > 0;
10B + 9 > 0; (20)
which is denitely true, given B is positive.
Looking at the opposite extreme, where there are maximum possible spillovers ( = 1), we nd that
Proposition 3: In a symmetric, cross-hauling, Cournot duopoly, with maximum possible spillovers, if
rms set R&D levels before governments decide on protection, then they will choose to collaborate if and only
if C > 0:064 and b > 0:51:
Proof. When  = 1, (19) becomes
(9  4B)2   (4 B)(18  4B) > 0;
81  72B + 16B2   72 + 34B   4B2 > 0;
12B2   38B + 9 > 0: (21)
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(21) would be an equality when
B =
38
24

p
(38x38)  (48x9)
24
= 0:26 or 2:91. (22)
Given the positive sign on B2 in (22), the function rst declines and then increases, so it will be negative
between the two roots. Also note that the upper root lies above the upper feasible value in (12). Consequently
0:26 < b2 < 2 or 4C ==> 0:51 < b <
p
2 or 2
p
C: (23)
The second constraint implies that, if
4C < 0:26 ==> C < 0:064; (24)
then there will be no value of b for which the rms will prefer to collaborate. Taking (23)-(24) together,
we can conclude that the rms will choose to collaborate rather than trigger protection if and only if there
are su¢ cient pre-R&D costs and if the responsiveness of those costs to R&D is su¢ ciently large to make
collaboration more protable than protection.
For intermediate cases of , equation (19) is rather complicated, so I apply numerical analysis. The
results are summarised in Figure 1, below:
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Figure 1: Effects of R&D sensitivity and spillovers on firms' gain from
not cooperating and enforcing a local monopoly.
Figure 1:
3.5 Parameter restrictions
The upper restrictions upon B are somewhat tighter in the case of a duopoly with spillovers than with a
monopoly. This is because costs in equilibrium fall to zero faster than in the monopoly case, setting an upper
limit on prots. Taking equation (17), and setting a lower limit of C 0 = 0, we nd
C 0 = 0 = C   2(2  )(1 + )b
2
9  2(2  )(1 + )b2 (1  C);
9C
2(2  )(1 + ) = b
2: (17a)
This corresponds to a limit of
B 6 9C
2(2  )(1 + ) : (25)
When  = 0; this corresponds to B 6 94C. Likewise, when  = 1; B 6
9
4C: For intermediate values of , the
upper limit of B is somewhat lower still, being at its lowest when  = 12 ; where B 6 2C:
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4 Welfare e¤ects
National welfare is taken to be
Wc = Vc +i=c; (26)
where Vc is consumer surplus and i=c is the prot made by the local rm in both markets (if it is allowed
to sell there). Consumer surplus is
Vc =
1  P
2
Q =
(Q1 +Q2)
2
2
: (27)
In the case of a monopoly,
V 
(1  C)2 =
( 44 B )
2
8
=
2
(4 B)2 ; (28)
and so
W 1
(1  C)2 =
V  +
(1  C)2 =
6 B
(4 B)2 : (29)
In the case of a cross-hauling duopoly,
V 0
(1  C)2 =
18
(9  2(2  )(1 + )B)2 : (30)
Noting that the rm makes prots in both markets,
W 01
(1  C)2 =
V 0 +0
(1  C)2 =
36  4(2  )2B
(9  2(2  )(1 + )B)2 : (31)
From comparing (29) and (31), welfare will be better o¤ with non-collaboration and local monopolies if
and only if
6 B
(4 B)2 >
36  4(2  )2B
(9  2(2  )(1 + )B)2 : (32)
Lemma 2 In the absence of spillovers between rms, in a symmetric, Cournot model of competition between
two rms in di¤erent countries, national welfare is higher with a crosshauling duopoly than with two local
monopolies.
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Proof. Set   0 in (32) The condition becomes
6 B
(4 B)2 >
36  16B
(9  4B)2 ; (32a)
.
(6 B)(9  4B) > 4(4 B)2; (33)
given 0 < B < 2 (so 9  4B is positive). Multiplying out, this becomes
54  33B + 4B2 > 64  32B + 4B2;
 10 B > 0; (33a)
which is clearly never true for B > 0.
This can be related to Brander and Krugmans (1983) results on reciprocal dumping, in the case where
there are no transport costs or tari¤s. Note that, dening the net welfare loss from a monopoly,
L =
6 B
(4 B)2  
36  16B
(9  4B)2 ; (34)
numerical analysis shows that, over the range 0 < B < 2, both L and LW 0 are monotonically declining with
respect to B. Hence, the gains from reciprocal dumping are increasing the more R&D can a¤ect costs. This
is shown in Figure 2, below:
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Figure 2:
We turn now to the case where there are maximum potential spillovers between rms ( = 1). In this
case, (33) becomes
(6 B)(9  4B)2 > 4(9 B)(4 B)2: (35)
Note that the only terms changed are on the RHS, and that this is now smaller than in (34). Consequently,
the nding that welfare is improved in a crosshauling duopoly compared to a monopoly is even stronger than
where there are no spillovers. Equation (34) becomes
L =
6 B
(4 B)2  
36  4B
(9  4B)2 ; (36)
which shows that L is greater than without spillovers.
This can be summarised as
Proposition 4: In a symmetric, Cournot model of competition between two rms in di¤erent countries,
national welfare is higher with a crosshauling duopoly than with two local monopolies, and this e¤ect is more
marked with full spillovers than with no spillovers.
Proof. See above.
A numerical simulation shows the welfare e¤ects of a monopoly compared to a collaborating duopoly -
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this is shown in Figure 3, below.
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Figure 3: Proportional loss of welfare from moving from a collaborating duopoly
to a protected monopoly
Figure 3:
However, we have already shown in Figure 1 that there are cases where rms opt to collaborate, rather
than trigger protection. Hence, in Figure 4, I superimpose onto Figure 3 the dividing line for rmsbehaviour.
Towards the top right hand corner, rms will not act to trigger protection: this includes most of the cases
where the potential loss of national welfare is greatest. However, to the left of/below the dividing line, there
are still areas with considerable welfare loss, particularly where  is high.
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Figure 4: Welfare loss from the HTBT game
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Figure 4: welfare losses from the regulatory protection game
In addition, from the parameter restrictions in equation (25), the areas towards the right hand side are
ruled out when C is relatively low.
5 Conclusion: when rms move rst
The aim of this paper was to see the e¤ects of regulatory protection upon welfare, in a game where rms
can move rst, in the sense that they can either collaborate (making regulatory protection impracticable)
or avoid collaboration (raising costs, but triggering regulatory protection). The question was whether rms
would act to encourage protection, or to forestall it, and a secondary question was the e¤ects upon welfare.
It is worth noting that the inclusion of R&D and of spillovers between rms potentially increases the
cost of regulatory protection, compared to a model without these features. Moreover, in many cases, rms
will choose to trigger such protection, leading to signicant welfare losses. However, in potentially the very
worst cases (high initial costs, high spillovers and a high R&D-sensitivity of costs), the e¤ect on costs from
not collaborating is such that rms will choose to collaborate, and protection will not occur.
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